Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno ( Spanish pronunciation: Ã, [ma'nwel no '? j? a] February 11, 1934 - May 29, 2017) was a Panamaian political and military officer who was Panama's de facto ruler from 1983 to 1989. He had a long-standing relationship with US intelligence agencies; however, he was removed from power by the US invasion of Panama.
Born in Panama City for a poor mestizo family, Noriega studied at the Chorrillos Military School in Lima and at the School of the Americas. He became an officer in the Panamanian army, and ascended through the ranks in an alliance with Omar Torrijos. In 1968, Torrijos overthrew President Arnulfo Arias in a coup, establishing himself as a leader; under the rule of Torrijos, Noriega became head of military intelligence. After the death of Torrijos in 1981, Noriega consolidated its power to become Panama's de facto ruler in 1983. From 1950 to before the US invasion, Noriega worked with US intelligence agencies. Noriega is one of the most valuable intelligence sources in the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as one of the main channels for illicit weapons, military equipment and cash destined for US-backed counter-insurgency forces across Latin America. The US also considers Noriega as an ally in the War on Drugs, although Noriega itself has accumulated private wealth through drug trafficking operations. Although the U.S. intelligence handler to know this, it is allowed because of its usefulness to the US.
Noriega relies on military nationalism to maintain its support, and does not support certain social or economic ideologies. In 1988, Noriega was indicted by federal grand jury in Miami and Tampa over allegations of extortion, drug smuggling and money laundering. After the US invasion of 1989 in Panama, he was arrested and flown to the United States, where he was tried on Miami charges. The trial, which lasted from September 1991 to April 1992, ended with Noriega's conviction over most of the allegations. He was sentenced to 40 years in prison, and ended up serving a 17-year sentence after a reduction in sentence and leave for good behavior. Noriega's US prison sentence expired in September 2007. In 2010, Noriega was extradited to France, where he was sentenced to seven years in prison for money laundering. In 2011 France extradited him to Panama, where he was imprisoned for crimes committed during his rule.
Diagnosed with a brain tumor in March 2017, Noriega suffered complications during surgery, and died two months later. Generally described as a military dictatorship, the Noriega government in Panama is characterized by media repression, military expansion, and the persecution of political opponents, effectively controlling the outcome of each election. He is known for his elaborate relationship with the US, who is portrayed as his ally and enemy at the same time. He has been called one of the most famous dictators of his time, and compared to authoritarian rulers such as Muammar Gaddafi and Augusto Pinochet.
Video Manuel Noriega
Early life and family
Noriega was born in Panama City, into a relatively poor relative mestizo family, or a mixed race, with a legacy of Native Americans, Africans and Spaniards. Ibu Noriega has been described as a cook or a dessert, while her father, Ricaurte Noriega, is an accountant. Not having a long presence in her life: her mother died of tuberculosis when she was a child. Noriega was raised by a godmother in a one-room apartment in the slums of TerraplÃÆ'Ã| n. The author and journalist stated that Noriega was actually an illegitimate son of his father and his father's domestic worker, whose family name was Moreno.
Noriega was first educated at Escuela RepÃÆ'ública de MÃÆ'à © xico, and later at Instituto Nacional, a respected high school in Panama City that has produced a number of nationalist political leaders. He is described as "a strange freak," a nerdy student who is always well-dressed by his cruel godmother. While at Instituto Nacional, he meets his brother Luis, a socialist activist and also a student at school: Manuel has never met his brothers. Manuel began living with Luis, who introduced him to politics, including recruiting him into the wings of the Socialist Youth. During his time in the Socialist youth group, Noriega took part in the protests and wrote articles that criticized the US presence in Panama. He is reported to have started his relationship with the US intelligence agency at this time, providing information about his colleagues' activities. He continued to work with the US intelligence services at various points until the 1980s: paying $ 10.70 in 1955 was the first of many payments he would receive from the US for his activities.
Noriega harbored the intention of becoming a doctor, but was unable to obtain a place in the Panama University medical school. After graduating from Instituto Nacional, Noriega won a scholarship to Chorrillos Military School in the Peruvian capital Lima, with the help of Luis, who at the time accepted a position at the Panama embassy in Peru. While in Peru he became acquainted with Roberto DÃÆ'az Herrera, who later became a close ally.
Noriega married Felicidad Sieiro de Noriega, whom he met in the 1960s, and the couple had three daughters; Lorena, Sandra, and Thays Noriega. Siero had been a schoolteacher, and Noriega was a member of the National Guard. His family, from the Basque heritage, were reportedly unhappy with the wedding. Noriega was repeatedly unfaithful to his wife, who at one point expressed a desire to divorce, though he changed his mind later.
Maps Manuel Noriega
Careers National Guard
Noriega graduated from Chorrillos in 1962 with a specialization in engineering. He returned to Panama and joined the Panamanian National Guard. Posted to Colon, he was given a commission as a second lieutenant in September 1962. His commanding officer at Colonel was Omar Torrijos, who later became Major in the National Guard. Torrijos becomes the protector and mentor for Noriega, protecting him when he gets into trouble. In the 1962 incident, according to journalist John Dinges, Torrijos helped Noriega avoid legal trouble after a prostitute accused Noriega of hitting and raping her. Immediately after that, Noriega's drinking and violence forced Torrijos to lock him into his home for a month. Despite Noriega's problems, Torrijos maintains their relationship, ensuring they are always in the same order; he also brought DÃÆ'az Herrera into the same unit. DÃÆ'az Herrera and Noriega became friends and rivals for Torrijos goodness. In 1966, Noriega was again involved in a violent incident, allegedly raping a 13-year-old girl and beating her sister. After this Torrijos moved Noriega to a remote post.
After several months, Noriega was transferred to ChiriquÃÆ' province, where Torrijos and DÃÆ'az Herrera were stationed. The presidential election that year was contested by Arnulfo Arias, who came from the province. The sitting president, Rodolfo Chiari, ordered Torrijos to harass members of the Arias party, to undermine his election offer. Torrijos hands over this task to Noriega, whose people capture a number of people. Some prisoners say they have been tortured; others stated that they had been raped in jail. The brutality of Noriega's activities caused him to be suspended for ten days, an item of information retrieved by US intelligence agencies.
As the second lieutenant in 1966, Noriega spent months participating in a course at the School of the Americas. The school is located in Fort Gulick of the United States Army in the Panama Canal Zone. Dinges suggested that Torrijos send Noriega to school to help him "mold" and meet Torrijos expectations. Despite his poor showing in his class, he received promotion in 1966, and Torrijos found him a job as an intelligence officer in the "Northern Zone" of the National Guard. Not long after that, he returned to American School for more training. During the various periods of time spent there, he participated in courses on infantry operations, counterintelligence, intelligence, and forest operations. He also took courses in psychological operations at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.
Noriega's work required him to penetrate and disrupt the union that had formed in the United Fruit Company's workforce, and he proved proficient in this work. His new chief officer, Boris MartÃÆ'nez, was a powerful anti-communist, and applied strict discipline to Noriega. The report stated that he continued to provide intelligence to the US during this period, about the activities of plantation workers. In 1967, the administration of US President Lyndon B. Johnson concluded that Noriega would be a valuable asset, since he was the "new star" in the Panama military. Noriega maintains a close relationship with the American School during his Presidency, partly because of Panama's outpost. Officials from the Panama military are often given free school courses. Noriega is proud of his relationship with the school, and will wear his emblem on his military uniform for the rest of his career.
Rise to power
Coup 1968
Arnulfo Arias was elected president in 1968 following a populist campaign. Immediately after taking office he launched a National Guard clearance, which sent most of his staff to "diplomatic exile" or retirement. In response, Torrijos and several other officers led the coup against him, expelling him after the eleven-day presidency. The power struggle took place between the various forces involved in the coup, and especially between Torrijos and MartÃÆ'nez. Noriega was an important supporter of Torrijos during this conflict. When Arias's supporters launched a guerrilla rebellion in his native province, Noriega as the intelligence chief played a key role in putting it in a year.
At the end of 1969 Torrijos went to Mexico on a holiday. The coup was launched when he was absent, where Noriega's loyalty enabled Torrijos to retain power, greatly enhancing Torrijos's image. Torrijos promoted Noriega to the position of lieutenant colonel and appointed him the head of military intelligence in August 1970: Noriega has changed from captain to lieutenant colonel in just a year and a half, and according to Dinges, has left an undisciplined past behind him. Torrijos retained power as a military ruler until 1981: during this time he negotiated the Torrijos-Carter Treaty with US President Jimmy Carter, which ensured that control of the Panama Canal would be forwarded to Panama in 1999. These agreements, as well as the new labor code which included maternity leave, collective bargaining rights, and bonus payouts, made Torrijos popular in Panama despite no democratic elections. GalvÃÆ'án writes that Torrijos's relationship with Noriega is symbiotic; Torrijos provides political acumen, while Noriega imposes his unpopular decision with power, when necessary. Noriega will provide intelligence, and perform covert operations, which are important for Torrijos who successfully negotiated the release of the Panama Canal from the US.
Head of intelligence
Noriega proved to be a very capable intelligence chief. In that position, he had 1300 exiled Panamanians whom he regarded as a threat to the government. He also keeps files in some officials in the military, government, and courts, then allows him to blackmail them. He also holds the position of political police chief, and head of immigration. His tenure was marked by intimidation and harassment of opposition parties and their leaders. He is depicted doing a lot of Torrijos dirty work. Journalist Frederick Kempe wrote in 1990 that Noriega has been linked to a series of bombings targeting US territories following the administration of US President Gerald Ford to withdraw from negotiations on the Panama Canal during the start of the US presidential election in 1976. The bombing highlighted to the US government the difficulty of maintaining the Canal Zone Panama in the face of hostilities inside Panama. Kempe stated that the US knew Noriega's involvement in the bombing but decided to turn a blind eye to them. In a December 1976 meeting with George H. W. Bush, then director of Central Intelligence, Noriega firmly denied involvement, claiming instead that the CIA was responsible. Noriega also ordered the death of Hector Gallegos, a priest working in an agricultural cooperative seen as a threat by the government: Gallegos's body is reported to have been thrown from a helicopter into the sea.
Noriega's relationship with the US intelligence service was organized during the 1970s, when he was on the CIA's payroll; The CIA made its first regular payment to him in 1971. Previously, he had been paid on a case-by-case basis. The CIA has rated him as an asset since the 1970s because he is willing to provide information about the Cuban government, and then about the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. On several occasions, the Panama embassy in Managua will be used by US intelligence agents. Noriega was given access to the CIA's emergency fund, which he should use to improve his intelligence program, but which he could spend with little accountability. The payout is as high as US $ 100,000 in a few years. However, the CIA realizes that Noriega sells intelligence in the US to Cuba at the same time. During negotiations for the Panama Canal deal, the US government ordered its military intelligence to tap Panama officials. Noriega discovered this operation in early 1976, and instead of making it public, bribed US agents and bought the tape itself; The incident then became known as the "Sergeant Singing affair". Although some intelligence officials wanted Bush to try the soldiers involved, he refused to do so, as it would expose Noriega's role in this matter. The CIA did not report this incident to the National Security Agency or the US Department of Justice. Noriega and Torrijos then use their knowledge of US wiretapping operations to tilt the Panama Canal negotiations for their sake.
Dinges writes that in the early 1970s the US Department of Justice had enough evidence to bring an indictment against Noriega on drug charges in US courts, but chose not to do so because of the diplomatic consequences involved. This evidence includes the testimony of a captured boatman, and a drug trafficker who was arrested in New York. Although Torrijos often promises US cooperation in handling drug smuggling, Noriega will make law enforcement efforts, and the US is beginning to take it as a real problem. Dinges writes that the US government is considering several options to move Noriega out of the drug trafficking business, including killing him, and linking him with a fictional plan against Torrijos. Although no attempted murder was committed, other ploys may have been tried in the early 1970s, according to Dinges. Beginning in 1972, however, Dinges wrote that the US is loosening its efforts to trap individuals involved with smuggling within the Panamanian government, possibly as a result of an agreement between Torrijos and US president Richard Nixon. In addition, during the same period Noriega became a trusted ally of the CIA, including serving as a US envoy to Cuba during negotiations after the Johnny Express incident. Noriega, too, sought during this period to portray Panama as the enforcement center for drug smuggling, possibly as a result of pressure from Torrijos. Drugs Noriega activities back to the attention of the government of A.S. again during the ratification process for the Panama Canal agreement, but was again rejected by the US intelligence agencies to obtain an agreement endorsed by the US Senate.
Death of Torrijos
After the Nicaraguan Revolution was launched against US-backed authoritarian author Anastasio Somoza Debayle in August 1978, Torrijos and Noriega initially supported the rebels, giving them an excess of National Guard equipment and allowing Panama to be used as a cover for cargo shipments from Cuba to Nicaragua. Torrijos sought for himself the same "democratic honor" aura that the Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua had, and therefore abandoned the title of "Maximum Leader" he took in 1972, promised that the election would be held in 1984. Noriega also arranged purchased shipping weapons in the US, an agreement in which he also made a profit. The United States discovered the role of Noriega in supplying weapons, and although the episode proved embarrassing for the administration of US President Jimmy Carter, no charges were filed against Noriega because the US did not want to upset the friendly government, and the issue became disputed by Sandinista Victory in 1979. Somoza was overthrown, Noriega continued to smuggle weapons, selling them to left-wing guerrillas fighting a US-backed authoritarian government in El Salvador. After one of these shipments was captured, Torrijos, who had a friend in the Salvadoran military government, rebuked Noriega, though the delivery did not stop at all.
Torrijos died in a plane crash on July 31, 1981. A subsequent investigation by the aircraft manufacturer stated it was an accident; Noriega's authority over government investigations led to speculation about his involvement. Florencio Flores Aguilar has inherited Torrijos's position, but true power is on the trio of Noriega, DÃÆ'az Herrera, and RubÃÆ' à © n DarÃÆ'o Paredes, which is below it. Flores was removed in a calm coup on March 3, 1982, after Paredes was made a leader until 1983 with a general agreement, after which the military would work together to ensure his election in a presidential election scheduled for 1984. During this period Noriega became a full Colonel and chief of staff of the National Guard, effectively the second highest ranking in the country. He reformed the National Guard as a Panama Defense Force (PDF), and with US financial assistance, expanded and modernized it. The quick promotion they received earned him the loyalty of officers. Among the steps taken to consolidate its control is to bring the various factions of soldiers together into PDF. On 12 August 1983, in accordance with previous Noriega agreements with Paredes, Paredes surrendered his position to Noriega, newly appointed general, with the understanding that Noriega would allow him to run for President. However, Paredes never received the political support he hoped for, and after taking his new position Noriega reneged on the deal, telling Paredes he could not follow the election. Noriega, now head of the PDF, thus becoming the de facto ruler of Panama.
Panama's de facto rule
1984 elections
Instead of being president, Noriega would rather stay behind the scenes, and avoid the public scrutiny that comes with the post. He has no particular social or economic ideology, and uses military nationalism to unite his supporters. Partido Revolucionario DemocrÃÆ'ático (Democratic Revolutionary Party, PRD), founded by Torrijos, is used by Noriega as the political front for the National Guard. Noriega forced the Panama Congress to pass Law 20, which was supposedly aimed at protecting the Panama Canal from communism, and allowing the entry of US weapons into the Panama military. The law also doubled the size of military forces, and gave the National Guards control over immigration, customs, commercial transport, railways and airports. The Noriega period in power sees a significant capital flight from Panama; according to Kempe, this is at least partly because the rich are concerned that their wealth will be confiscated by the Noriega government.
Noriega takes over most of the major newspapers by buying controlling stocks in them, or by forcing them to close. The government also harasses, intimidates, or alienates individual journalists and editors. The La Prensa newspaper, which remains independent and often criticizes Noriega, makes his staff feel intimidated and his office is broken; finally, it was also forced to close. In May 1984, Noriega allowed the first presidential election in 16 years. Noriega and DÃÆ'az Herrera chose NicolÃÆ'ás Ardito Barletta Vallarino to become a PRD candidate, with a view to keeping him under control. When initial results showed Arias, who had the support of many oppositions, on the way to victory, Noriega stopped the count. After boldly manipulating the results, the government announced that Barletta had won by a narrow margin of 1,713 votes. Independent estimates suggest that Arias will win as many as 50,000 votes if the election is fair. More than 60,000 votes were not included in the final count. The US government is aware of this manipulation, but chooses not to comment on it. The Noriega government became increasingly repressive, even as the US government of Ronald Reagan began to rely on it in its secret efforts to weaken the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The United States accepted Barletta's election, and signaled a willingness to cooperate with him, despite admitting shortcomings in the electoral process.
Operation of weapons and weapons â ⬠<â â¬
In the early 1970s, American law enforcement officers had reports of Noriega's involvement with narcotics trade. However, no formal criminal investigation was conducted, with news reports linking the lack of action to factors including US interests in concluding the Panama Canal treaty, the Panama intelligence value, and Panama's support for U.S. foreign policy.
During the early 1980s, civil wars broke out in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. US shipments of weapons to the region increased dramatically as a result, as did drug trafficking into the United States, especially cocaine. In the 1980s, Noriega's involvement with drug smuggling also increased. Dinges writes that Noriega often receives large payouts, sometimes as high as $ 100,000 per delivery, in exchange for smugglers who receive immunity from prosecution. A report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency declared that Noriega holds strong control over drug-related activities and money laundering through a group of close associates in the military. On June 12, 1986, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh published an article in The New York Times describing Noriega's involvement in drug smuggling and money laundering. Hersh noted a White House official said that reducing Noriega's activities could greatly reduce the international drug trade.
In addition to drug smuggling, Noriega's partners such as Floyd Carlton and Cesar RodrÃÆ'guez are also finally involved with money laundering: large sums of drug revenues are brought from Miami and elsewhere to Panama for laundering, and Noriega receives protection payments in this regard as well.. American Steven Kalish also started a business selling large-scale medicines, money laundering and hardware sales to the Panamanian military for big profits with the help of Noriega. Dinges writes that at the time of the 1984 election, Kalish was preparing to deliver a marijuana worth of US $ 1.4 million through Panama, of which Noriega had agreed to provide a fake Panamanian customs stamp to help avoid a US inspection. Noriega must be paid $ 1 million for this exercise. However, starting in 1984 Noriega seems to have reduced the scale of its operations, and even ordered an attack on a cocaine plant in the interior of Panama, an attack he later emphasized as a testament to his cooperation with the United States in their fight against drugs. He also ordered a hard money laundering action by the Colombian cartel. Noriega's new image is symbolized by her invited as a speaker in 1985 to Harvard University, for a conference on the role of the military in the Central American wars, a speech that drew much attention in the Panama pro-government press.
Noriega began supplying weapons to the M-19 rebel group in Colombia in 1981. On one occasion, weapons provided PDFs to a small group of M-19 fighters who flew to Panama from Cuba before the attack on the west coast of Colombia. According to some reports, the M-19 also asked Noriega to mediate their negotiations with the Colombian drug cartel in February 1982. A 1990 book discussing the Noriega government declared that it had sold 5000 Panama passports to the Cuban government for use by its intelligence services. Noriega's direct involvement in the removal of weapons and drugs declined in the early 1980s; instead, he invests in legal business, and uses it as a cover for money laundering operations, most of which are related to drug trafficking. US intelligence agencies believe Noriega has amassed personal wealth in European banks as a result of illegal activities, as well as having two houses in Panama and one in France.
CIA engagement and US support
Noriega acts as a conduit for US support to Contra militants in Nicaragua over the years, including funds and weapons. He allowed the CIA to set up a listening post in Panama, and also helped the US-backed Salvadoran government against the left Front Salvadoran Front Liberation Front Farabundo Martion. US spy ships use bases in Panama in their operations against the Nicaraguan government, and much intelligence gathered by these ships is processed at a US base in Panama. Noriega allows this activity even though the Panama Canal agreement limits the use of US bases to protect the canal.
Noriega had a working relationship with US Col. Oliver North in 1985. Noriega offered to help the North kill or sabotage the Sandinista leaders in exchange for helping Noriega improve his image with the US government. In June 1985 Noriega agreed to train troops in Panama to invade Nicaragua in 1986. Noriega was reported to have played a role in Iran-Contra affairs in the mid-1980s, where the proceeds of arms sales to Iran were smuggled. to support Contras. At the Noriega trial in 1991-92, the US government determined that they had paid $ 322,000 to Noriega. Journalists and historians have suggested that the numbers are much higher: Kempe suggests $ 110,000 annually, while others have raised $ 200,000 annually. Kempe suggested that the budget given to Noriega for his intelligence activities amounted to $ 200,000 annually. This payment includes $ 76,039 as a "gift and incentive" from the CIA. CIA Director William Webster will describe Noriega as an ally in the US government's war on drugs. Officials in the Reagan administration claimed that Noriega's drug-related activities had been ignored because he was a US ally in the conflict in Central America. The US is also worried that any substitute for Noriega will not tolerate the US military presence in Panama.
A US Senate Subcommittee of 1988 on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations concluded: "The story of Panama General Manuel Antonio Noriega was one of the most serious foreign policy failures for the United States During the 1970s and 1980s, Noriega was able to manipulate the United States. policy to his country while skillfully collecting almost absolute powers in Panama It is clear that any US government agency with links to Noriega turns a blind eye to corruption and drug trafficking, even when he emerges as a key player on the name of MedellÃÆ'n Cartel (a member known as the drug lord of Colombia, Pablo Escobar). "Noriega was allowed to establish the" first narcocleptocracy in the hemisphere ". One of the major financial institutions he can use to launder money is the International Credit and Trading Bank. In the 1988 US presidential election, Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis highlighted this history in a commercial campaign that struck his opponent, Vice President (and former CIA Director) George H. W. Bush, for his close relationship with "Panama's drug leader Noriega". Kempe argued in 1990 that the US provided much training that enabled it to dominate Panama, and called Noriega's relationship with the US as "an unpleasant marriage".
Spadafora and subsequent killings
Hugo Spadafora was a doctor and political activist who first clashed with Noriega when they were both members of the Torrijo government. Although Torrijos's allies, he and Noriega have been personal enemies for a long time. Despite not being a member of the opposition, he became a vocal critic of Noriega after returning to Panama from Guatemala in 1981. Spadafora gathered evidence of corruption within the government using his position as Torrijos ally to question allies of Noriega, including Rodriquez and Carlton. This included a lengthy conversation with Carlton in mid-1985 after his drug surgery collapsed due to a lost shipping conflict, and he had received negative publicity in the Panama press. In September 1985 he accused Noriega of having links to drug trafficking and announced his intention to return to Panama to oppose him. The allegations of drug smuggling threaten Noriega's support among his own constituents of middle-class individuals who benefit under his rule and Torrijos.
According to the authors R. M. Koster and Guillermo SÃÆ'ánchez, Spadafora returned to Panama by bus from Costa Rica. After crossing the border, the witness saw Spadafora removed from the bus by PDF. His beheaded body was later found to be showing signs of brutal torture, wrapped in a US Postal mail bag. Noriega is widely believed to be responsible for the killing, and according to Koster and SÃÆ'ánchez, the US has an intelligence involving Noriega. On the day of Spadafora's arrest, the US National Security Service monitored a telephone conversation between Noriega and Luis CÃÆ'órdoba, the military commander in ChiriquÃÆ' province where Spadafora was arrested. During the conversation, CÃÆ'órdoba told Noriega, "We have a mad dog." Noriega replied, "And what does that have to do with a rabid dog?" The Spadafora assassination badly damaged Noriega's image, both inside and outside Panama, and is one of the reasons for the US to start seeing Noriega as a liability and not an asset, despite its ongoing support for US intervention elsewhere.
Barletta announced its intention to appoint an independent commission to investigate the killing while visiting New York City in September. On his return to Panama, however, resigned from the presidency after a confrontation with Noriega. He was replaced by Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle. Barletta was highly respected in the Reagan administration, and his dismissal led to a decline in relations between the US and Noriega. The US response included reducing economic aid and pressuring Panama to reform its banking secrecy laws, crack down on narcotics trafficking, investigate the Spadafora killings, and reduce the role of FDP in the government.
While Noriega was abroad, DÃÆ'az Herrera considered using the uproar around Spadafora to seize power, but despite mobilizing some troops, finally decided not to follow the coup, realizing he could not rely on sufficient support. In addition, Noriega has made a deal with his deputy, stating that he will step down as military leader in 1987 and allow DÃÆ'az Herrera to succeed him. However, in 1987, Noriega returned to this agreement, announcing he would head for the military for the next five years, and assign Herrera to a diplomatic post. DÃÆ'az Herrera retaliated by making a public statement accusing Noriega of cheating the 1984 election, killing Spadafora, and drug trafficking, and killing Torrijo with a bomb on his plane. These statements provoked great protests against Noriega, with 100,000 people, about 25% of Panama City's population, marching against protest on June 26, 1987. Noriega accused Herrera of treason, and cracked down on the protesters. The US Senate submitted a resolution calling for Noriega to retreat until Herrera could be tried; In response, Noriega sent government workers to protests outside the US embassy, ââa protest that quickly turned into unrest. As a result, the US suspended all military aid to Panama, and the CIA stopped paying Noriega's salary. The Senate resolution has the effect of identifying the US with an attempt to remove Noriega; Noriega exploits rising anti-American sentiment to strengthen his own position. Without US support, Panama failed to pay its international debt, and that year the economy shrank by 20%. However, although the US is considered not to recognize the new president, the department overseas decided not to do so, as it would violate the relationship with Noriega.
1989 elections
Noriega's relationship with the US worsened during the late 1980s, especially after the US began to suspect that Noriega lent its support to intelligence services and other drug trafficking groups. Hersh wrote in 1986 that US intelligence officials suspected Noriega of selling intelligence to the Cuban government at Fidel Castro; his report received widespread attention. Bob Woodward published a story about Noriega in The Washington Post shortly thereafter, discussing deeper details about Noriega's intelligence connections. Woodward and Hersh's reputation ensured that the stories were taken seriously. Spadafora has also notified the US Drug Abuse Administration of some of his findings about Noriega's involvement in smuggling. Several agencies are investigating Noriega in the US, continues despite opposition from the Reagan administration. In 1988 Noriega was indicted in US courts on charges of drug trafficking. The indictment accuses him of "turning Panama into a delivery platform for South American cocaine aimed at the US, and allowing drug yields to be hidden in Panamanian banks." Soon afterwards, an army Colonel and several soldiers attempted to overthrow Noriega; their poorly planned efforts were destroyed in one day.
The May 1989 presidential election was marred by fraud and violence. COLINA, a pro-military coalition led by the PRD, was named Carlos Duque, a former business partner of Noriega as his candidate. The ADOC, an opposition coalition, nominated Guillermo Endara, member of Ariam 'PanameÃÆ' à ± ista Party, and two other prominent opposition, Ricardo Arias CalderÃÆ'ón and Guillermo Ford, as vice presidential candidates. Anticipating fraud, the opposition keeps track of the number of ballots in the surrounding area on election day (local vote counting is done in public). When a poll showed clearly that the opposition slate won by a wide margin, reports about the loss of the counting sheets and the confiscation of the ballot box by the PDF immediately appeared. In the afternoon after the election, the Catholic Bishops' Conference announced that a quick counting of public counts in polling centers showed the 3-to-1 opposition slate. Official details a day after that, however, made Duque win by 2-1.
Instead of publishing the results, Noriega canceled the election, claiming "foreign interference" had polluted the results. Former US President Jimmy Carter, who was present in Panama as an observer, blasted Noriega, saying the election had been "stolen", as did Bishop Marcos G. McGrath. He originally planned to announce the winning Duque without regard to actual results. However, Duque knew he had been defeated and refused to come. The next day, Endara, Arias CalderÃÆ'ón, and Ford rolled through the old part of the capital in a triumphant motorcade, only to be intercepted by the Noriega paramilitary Battalion Battalion detachment. Arias CalderÃÆ'ón was protected by some troops, but Endara and Ford were severely beaten. Ford's picture ran to safety with his bloody guayabera shirt broadcast all over the world. When the 1984-89 presidency ended, Noriega appointed an old partner, Francisco RodrÃÆ'guez, as acting president. The US recognizes Endara as the new president. Noriega's decision to cancel the election result led to another coup attempt against him in October 1989. A number of junior Noriega officers rose up against him, but the rebellion was easily destroyed by members of the Defense Forces loyal to Noriega. After this effort, he declared himself the "maximum leader" of the country. The rebels were arrested and taken to a military base outside Panama City, where they were tortured and then executed.
AS. Panama invasion
Genesis
In March 1988, the US government negotiated with Noriega seeking his resignation. After lengthy and unconvincing conversations, negotiations collapsed a few months later; according to Dinges, Noriega did not intend to resign. On December 15, 1989, the PRD-dominated parliament spoke of a "state of war" between the United States and Panama. It also declared Noriega the "chief executive officer" of the government, formalizing an existing situation for six years. The US government declared that Noriega's forces were involved in routine harassment of troops and US civilians. Three incidents in particular occurred very close to the time of the invasion, and was mentioned by Bush as the reason for the invasion. In the December 16 incident, four US personnel were stopped in a roadblock outside the PDF headquarters in El Chorrillo neighborhood in Panama City. The US Defense Department said that the soldiers were traveling without weapons in private vehicles, and that they were trying to escape from the scene only after their vehicles were surrounded by a crowd of civilians and PDF troops. Robert Paz of the United States Marine Corps was shot and killed in the incident. A couple of Americans who witnessed the incident were also arrested and harassed by PDF.
Invasion
The US launched the invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989. Although the Marines' murder was the real reason for the invasion, operations had been planned for months before his death. The move is the largest military action by the US since the Vietnam War, and includes more than 27,000 troops, as well as 300 aircraft. The Bush administration considers mild attacks using fewer troops, but decides against them. US troops target personal vehicles Noriega. Several slums in central Panama were destroyed in a US bombing campaign. The day after the invasion, Noriega's deputy, Colonel Luis del Cid, retreated with some soldiers to the mountains outside David City, after laying mines at the airport. Although this was part of the contingency plan for the invasion, del Cid quickly decided that the Panama military was not in a position to fight the guerrilla war against the US, and negotiate submission. The number of US soldiers killed in the operation was between 23 and 60; 300 soldiers wounded. The casualties among the Panamanian troops were much higher; between 300 and 845. A large number of civilians were killed in the invasion: the right numbers are a matter of debate. The US government reports between 202 and 250 civilian deaths; American Watch estimates 300 civilian deaths; The UN estimates 500 civilian deaths and former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark estimates that 3,000 civilians were killed.
On December 29, the UN General Assembly voted, 75-20 with 40 abstentions, to condemn the invasion as "a striking violation of international law". The invasion was followed by widespread looting, when the Panamanian police stood aside; Kempe reported that the looters caused half a billion dollars in damage, which was later repaired by the US government. Overall, the invasion will cause property damage of US $ 1.5 billion. According to a CBS poll, 92% of Panama's adults support the US attack, and 76% expect US troops to invade in October during the coup. Activist Barbara Trent denied this finding, said in an 1992 Academy Award-winning documentary The Panama Deception that the Panama survey was completed in a rich English-speaking environment in Panama City, among Panama residents who are likely to support the US. action. Human Rights Watch described the civilian reaction to the invasion as "generally sympathetic".
Capture
Noriega received several warnings about the invasion of the people in his government; although initially he did not trust them, they grew more often when the invasion got closer, eventually convincing Noriega to go on the run. Noriega uses a number of subfinders, including blank stares and voice recording, to confuse US control over his whereabouts. During his flight Noriega was reportedly sheltered with some supportive politicians, including Balbita Perià ¢ an, mayor of San Miguelóo. The last two days of his flight were spent in part with Noriega's ally Jorge Krupnick. Kempe reports that Noriega is considering seeking refuge at the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies, but both buildings are surrounded by US forces. On the fifth day of the invasion, Noriega and four others took refuge in Apostolic Nunciature, the embassy embassy in Panama. After being threatened with escaping into the countryside and leading a guerrilla warfare if he was not given shelter, he surrendered most of his weapons, and sought refuge from José © SebastiÃÆ'án Laboa, papal representative.
Prevented by the treaty of the invasion of the Holy See embassy, ââUS soldiers from Delta Force set up a perimeter around Nunciature. Psychological warfare specialists were brought in to try to oust him, including blaring rock music, and turning a nearby field into a helicopter landing zone. After ten days, Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. He was detained as a prisoner of war, and then taken to the United States.
Prosecution and imprisonment
Prosecution in the United States
After his arrest, Noriega was transferred to a cell in the Miami federal courthouse, where he was dragged on ten charges in which the Miami grand jury had returned two years earlier. The beginning of the trial was postponed until September 1991 due to the complicated legal maneuvers over whether Noriega could be tried after his detention as a prisoner of war, the receipt of evidence and witnesses, and how to pay for Noriega's defense. The trial ended in April 1992, when Noriega was found guilty of eight of the ten charges of drug trafficking, extortion and money laundering.
In the pre-trial process, the government determined that Noriega had received $ 322,000 from the US Army and the CIA. Noriega insists that he has actually paid close to $ 10,000,000, and that he should be allowed to testify about the work he has done for the US government. The district court stated that information about the operation in which Noriega plays a role that should be in return for payments from the US is irrelevant to his defense. He decided that "the tendency of such evidence to disrupt the problem before the jury substantially exceeds any probable value it may have." One of the witnesses in the trial was Floyd Carlton, who had previously flown drug delivery for Noriega.
Information about Noriega's connection to the CIA, including his relationship with Oliver North and the contacts he alleged to have with Bush, has been kept out of court. After the trial, Noriega appealed the decision of this exception by the judge to the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeal decided to support the government, despite disagreeing with the lower court. It is said: "Our review leads us to conclude that information about the objectives previously presented by Noriega has the potential to have a probative value;... Thus, the district court may have exaggerated the case when proclaiming the purpose for which the United States accused of paying Noriega is completely irrelevant to his defense. " The Court of Appeal refused to rule out the verdict because it felt that "the potential probative value of this material, however, is relatively marginal". On July 10, 1992, Noriega was sentenced to 40 years in prison.
Incarceration
Prior to receiving his assignment at the permanent prison, Noriega was placed in the Federal Detention Center, Miami, facility. Noriega lives in a Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, in an area unrelated to Dade County, Florida, and has a Federal Bureau of Prisons Number 38699-079. Under Article 85 of the Third Geneva Convention, Noriega is considered a prisoner of war, despite his belief in actions taken before his capture by the "detention force" (USA). This status means that he has his own prison cell, equipped with electronic equipment and sports. The cell was dubbed "presidential suite".
It is reported that Noriega has been visited by evangelical Christians, who claim that he has become a born-again Christian. On May 15 and 16, 1990, while Noriega was still awaiting trial, Clift Brannon, a former lawyer became a preacher, and a Spanish translator Rudy Hernandez was allowed to visit Noriega for a total of six hours at the Dade County Metropolitan District Correctional Center. , Florida. After the visit, Noriega wrote a letter to Brannon, thanked him, and stated that his visit was like "dreams, revelations," and that "receiving our Lord Jesus Christ as your guided Savior" has become an emotional moment for him. Noriega's prison sentence reduced from 30 years to 17 years for good behavior. After serving 17 years in custody and imprisonment, his sentence expired on 9 September 2007.
Prosecution in France
The French government requested the extradition of Noriega after he was convicted of money laundering in 1999. France claims that Noriega has laundered $ 3 million in drug results by buying luxury apartments in Paris. Noriega was found guilty in in absentia , but French law required a new experiment after the subject of the sentence in absentia was captured. He faces up to 10 years in a French prison if found guilty. France had previously made Noriega as Commandeur of LÃÆ' à © gion d'honneur in 1987.
In August 2007, a US federal judge approved the request of the French government to extradite Noriega to France after his release. Noriega appealed his extradition because he claimed that France would not respect his legal status as a prisoner of war. In 1999, the Panamanian government sought the extradition of Noriega to face charges of murder in Panama because he was found guilty in 1995 and sentenced to 20 years in prison.
On February 20, 2010, Noriega's lawyers petitioned the United States Supreme Court to block her extradition to France, after the court refused to hear her appeal the previous month. Noriega's lawyers expect a different opinion in the verdict, written by Judges Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, will convince the full court to take his case, but on March 22, 2010, the Supreme Court refused to hear the petition. Two days after the rejection, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Miami raised a stay that precluded the extradition of Noriega. Later that month Noriega's lawyer stated that he would go to France and try to arrange an agreement with the French government.
Noriega was extradited to France on 26 April 2010. Noriega's lawyer claimed La Santà © Prison, where he was detained, unfit for men of his age and rank; the French government refused to grant him the status of prisoners of war, which he had in the United States. On July 7, 2010, Noriega was convicted by the 11th room of the Corectionnel de Paris and sentenced to seven years in prison. The prosecutor in that case sought a ten-year prison term. In addition, the court ordered foreclosure of EUR2.3 million (about US $ 3.6 million) which has been frozen in French bank accounts Noriega.
Back, sick, and death
Panama asks France to extradite Noriega so he can face trial for human rights abuses in Panama. The French government has previously stated that extradition will not happen before the case in France goes. On September 23, 2011, a French court ordered parole for Noriega to be extradited to Panama on October 1, 2011. Noriega was extradited to Panama on December 11, 2011, and was imprisoned in El Renacer jail to serve time for crimes committed during his reign.
On February 5, 2012, Noriega was transferred to Santo Tomas Hospital due to high blood pressure and cerebral hemorrhage. He remained in the hospital for four days before being returned to prison. It was announced on March 21, 2012, that Noriega was diagnosed with a brain tumor, which was later revealed to have been benign. On January 23, 2017, he was released from prison and placed under house arrest to prepare for surgery that would remove the tumor. On March 7, 2017, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage during an operation that kept him in critical condition in the intensive care unit of Santo Tomas hospital in Panama City.
Noriega died on May 29, 2017, at the age of 83. Panama President Juan Carlos Varela announced the death of Noriega on Twitter shortly before midnight, writes, "Manuel A. Noriega's death closes a chapter in our history; his daughters and relatives deserve to bury it with peaceful. "His wife and three daughters were all alive at the time of his death.
Images and inheritance
Noriega's rule in Panama is often described as a dictatorship, while Noriega is often referred to as a "strongman". A 2017 obituary states that Noriega "is an opportunist who uses his close relationship with the United States to increase his own power in Panama and to cover up the illegal activities he finally decided." A 2010 article in The Guardian referred to him as a famous dictator of his time, and as "Panama's answer" to Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. "Dinges writes that although the Noriega regime sees a number of murders and crimes, they have a scale similar to what happened under authoritarian rule in Guatemala, Chile, and Argentina, and El Salvador at the same time, these governments have never seen the level of US criticism as Noriega did.
An article in The Atlantic after Noriega's death compared Noriega to Castro and Augusto Pinochet, who claimed that while Castro had become an enemy of the United States, and Pinochet was his ally, Noriega managed to become both. This is called the Noriega archetype of US intervention in Latin America: "The cruel and cruel leader who was raised and sustained by the US despite the obvious and serious shortcomings." The authors state that although Panama is a more free democratic country for the abolition of Noriega, it is still plagued by corruption and drug trafficking, while Daniel Ortega, who the US is trying to fight with Noriega's help, remains in power in Nicaragua, and argues that this suggests the failure of the US approach against Latin American intervention. Similarly, writers Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St-Clair stated that despite the overthrow of Noriega, Panama's interests in the illegal drug trade continued to grow.
Noriega is very careful to shape her perception. He allows and encourages rumors that as intelligence chief, he has negative information about everyone in the country. Dinges suggests that the impression among some officials that Noriega makes money from every transaction in the country may have been cultivated by Noriega himself. Among the opposition leaders in Panama, he is seen as a sexual figure, as a sadist, and a rapist. Within the US government circle, contradictory images abound; Noriega was seen as a CIA spy, drug trafficker, a nationalist who supported Torrijos, a Cuban ally, and an ally of Oliver North and Contras. He is considered a trusted collaborator in the fight against drugs, even when the DEA is investigating him for engaging in smuggling. At the time of his dismissal, he had been hated in the US, and the invasion was described as an attempt to get rid of the wicked. Dinges writes that these contradictory images play a major role in the US government's contradictory policy towards Noriega.
Noriega uses the moniker "El Man" to call himself, but is also known by the nickname "Pineapple Faces", a name that Noriega hates, and who will be the subject of a later suit. He had a lavish lifestyle during his time as Panama's de facto ruler, portrayed in an obituary as "a litde life of drug trafficking, complete with luxury homes, cocaine-fueled parties, and large collections- scale, antique weapons. "His hatred during public speeches was commented on by commentators; for example, after his indictment by the US, he made a public speech while holding up a machete, and declared "Not a step back!" The machismo attitude adopted by Noriega is described as a reaction to the persecution facing his older brother Luis as an open homosexual man in Panama and Peru. This picture contrasts sharply with the impact of mug shots taken from him after his capture, and which symbolizes his fall from power. He is reported to have become a superstitious believer, who put his trust in a number of amulets he carried with him.
In popular culture
British actor Bob Hoskins plays Manuel Noriega in the 2000 biopic American television movie Noriega: God's Favorite . The film is described as a "deep-bite political drama", depicted by "wild humor". A reviewer writes that "the career of raising the hair of Panama's ousted dictator Manuel Noriega goes even beyond the surreal creations of many Latin American novelists, thus making it a natural movie subject". Hoskins was nominated for a Satellite Award for his role in the film.
Noriega is portrayed in the computer game Call of Duty: Black Ops II . In July 2014, he filed a lawsuit against the Activision gaming company for describing him and using his name without permission. Noriega, who filed a temporary suit in prison for murder, claimed he was described as "kidnapper, murderer and state enemy". In the game, Frank Woods's fictional character refers to Noriega as "Old Pineapple Face", a nickname that was originally applied to the President by Panamanians. On October 28, 2014, the case against Activision was dismissed by a judge in California.
See also
- Sarah York
Notes and references
Quote
Bibliography
Further reading
External links
- The Official Archive of General Manuel Antonio Noriega
- 1989 Report on the human rights situation in Panama by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
- Pen Palku , the story of Sarah York, a girl from a small Michigan town who was a pen pal with Noriega, beginning in 1988.
Source of the article : Wikipedia